Abstract: This paper surveys the trade literature on international technology transfer, paying particular attention to the role of foreign direct investment. A central question of interest is whether technologies introduced by multinationals diffuse to local firms. Major conclusions of theoretical models as well as the relevant empirical evidence regarding technology spillovers are discussed. The paper also discusses the potential impact of host country policies regarding trade, foreign direct investment, and intellectual property rights protection on international technology transfer.
Non-technical summary
This paper critically surveys the literature that explores the role of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) as channels of international technology transfer. Attention is paid to the role that wholly owned subsidiaries of multinational firms and international joint ventures play in transmitting technology globally. Arms length channels of technology transfer such as licensing are also discussed.
Central conclusions of the paper are as follows:
• The role of trade in encouraging growth hinges critically on the geographical scope (national versus international) of knowledge spillovers. Empirical studies have not yet delivered a clear judgement on this issue and the truth may simply be that, for developing countries, spillovers are more likely to be national in scope than for industrialized countries.
• Local policy frequently makes pure FDI infeasible, forcing foreign firms to opt for licensing or joint ventures. Empirical evidence supporting the idea that the latter modes of technology transfer lead to more learning by local firms is scant or completely missing. To be fair, few careful studies have attempted this difficult task. So, the jury is still out on this question.
• Policies designed to attract FDI are proliferating. If the case for such policies rests on positive spillovers from FDI to domestic firms, then the case may be rather weak. Several recent plant level studies have failed to find positive spillovers from FDI to firms competing directly with subsidiaries of multinationals. However, these studies need a careful interpretation since they treat FDI as exogenous. Second, FDI spillovers may have a vertical nature rather than the horizontal nature assumed in such studies. Furthermore, all such studies find that the subsidiaries of multinationals are more productive than domestic firms. Thus, regardless of the evidence on the spillover issue, FDI does result in a more effective use of resources in host countries.
• Several studies (both theoretical and empirical) indicate that absorptive capacity in the host country is crucial for obtaining significant benefits from FDI. Without adequate human capital or investments in R&D, spillovers from FDI will fail to materialize. This finding underscores the importance of countries' policies toward education, accumulation of human capital, and R&D.
• Policy towards protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) may alter the composition of FDI both at the industry level as well as at the firm level. Industries in which IPRs are crucial (such as pharmaceuticals), firms may either refrain from FDI if IPR protection is weak in the host country or choose not to invest in manufacturing and R&D activities. Lastly, IPR policy may also affect the mode of technology transfer (licensing, joint ventures, or establishment of wholly owned subsidiaries).
Introduction
It is well understood that economic growth results either from accumulation of factors of production or from improvements in technology or both. To encourage the generation of new knowledge, industrialized countries have elaborate systems of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in place and conduct majority of the world's research and development (R&D). Technologies resulting from such R&D spread throughout the world through a multitude of channels. At a fundamental level, one can draw a distinction between international trade in technology and other indirect channels of international technology transfer such as trade in goods and international movement of factors of production. This paper critically surveys the literature that explores the role of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) as channels of international technology transfer.
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With respect to FDI, a distinction is made between wholly owned subsidiaries of multinational firms and international joint ventures. Furthermore, FDI is contrasted with arms length channels of technology transfer such as licensing.
The paper argues that while the literature has done a decent job of outlining the various potential channels through which international technology transfer occurs, not enough is known, both in theory and practice, about the relative importance of each of these channels. 2 This lack of knowledge automatically limits our understanding of the role policy plays in facilitating the process of international technology transfer. For example, the literature still continues to debate whether increased openness to trade encourages economic growth. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, few economists advocate the imposition of trade restrictions. 3 In fact, the general feeling seems to be that traditional analyses may very well understate the true cost of protectionism since most such analyses utilize static models and ignore the dynamic costs of trade protection. Underlying this view is the notion, that, somehow, trade of goods and services, foreign direct investment (FDI) and interaction among countries in various other forms all play a crucial role in improving not only the global allocation of physical resources but also in transmitting technology globally. However, 1 To restrict the focus of the paper, the international movement of labor (for example, the process of reverse brain drain and movement of consultants) is not discussed. 2 Purely for the sake of clarity, the paper refers to the spread of know-how across countries as international technology transfer and within a country as technology diffusion. 3 See Dollar (1992) , Sachs and Werner (1995) , for empirical studies that support the view that open economies grow faster and Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) for a recent, more critical view of this literature and its main conclusion.
how exactly this transmission occurs is not yet fully understood, making international technology transfer an active area of research.
Section 2 of the paper discusses dynamic trade models that shed light on the complex relationship between technology and trade. These models frequently lead to ambiguous welfare conclusions. Much as one may desire, the existing literature (both theoretical and empirical) simply does not provide a blanket endorsement of trade as an engine for growth. 4 However, it is also not the case that 'anything can happen'. In fact, the theoretical literature suggests that the scope of knowledge spillovers is a crucial determinant of whether or not trade necessarily encourages growth (Grossman and Helpman, 1995) . However, empirical evidence has failed to settle the issue: some studies discover that knowledge spillovers have a limited geographical scope, whereas others find the opposite.
Yet, even a definitive measurement of the scope of knowledge spillovers would not settle the issue, particularly for those interested in the process of international technology transfer. What determines the scope of knowledge spillovers? This paper argues that a central role must belong to interaction between innovators (potential suppliers of technology) and those firms and entrepreneurs that seek to gain access to newer technologies either through costly imitation or through technology licensing and other forms of collaboration with innovators. This perspective implies that a fair bit of technology transfer may indeed be endogenous.
In his excellent discussion of the special properties of knowledge as an economic good, Romer (1990) makes the important point that knowledge is a non-rival good: it can be used simultaneously by two different agents. One must be careful however, to not jump from this argument to the claim that knowledge can be transferred across agents at zero cost. If this were true, the room for policy intervention with respect to international assimilation of technology would be severely limited since any technology transfer that would yield even a minutely positive return to any agent would take place automatically. 5 The non-rival nature of knowledge only implies that if two agents are willing to pay the cost of adopting a new idea or a technology, they can do so without interfering with each other's decisions. Much empirical evidence (Teece 1976 , Mansfield and Romeo, 1980 , Ramachandran, 1993 indicates that it is indeed costly to transfer technology internationally. In his survey of twenty nine technology transfer projects, Teece (1976) found that on average such costs were approximately twenty percent of the total costs of the project and in some cases, they were as high as sixty percent.
The fact that international technology transfer occurs through a multitude of channels makes it especially difficult to arrive at an aggregate measure of the activity and hence to assess its contribution to economic growth in both source and host countries. 6 In fact, if one could somehow rank the different channels of technology transfer in terms of their relative importance, empirical analysis could then proceed by ignoring the relatively unimportant of these channels.
However, given that multiple options exist in theory, the dominance of any one channel in the data would itself require explanation. And indeed, the emergence and expansion of multinationals,
given the existence of alternative arrangements for transacting in technology, has been viewed as a phenomenon that requires explanation. This question is addressed in greater detail in section 4.
A major question of interest is that once a technology has been introduced into a country, does it subsequently diffuse throughout the rest of the economy? The presence of barriers across countries, as well as international differences in market conditions and policy environments necessarily imply that the technology diffusion within a country may be considerably easier than One goal of this paper is to help identify the role policy plays in facilitating international technology transfer. The range of relevant policies is clearly quite large. To limit the scope of the paper, I only address the role of trade, FDI, and IPR policies (section 5). Given the central questions of interest, the literature on FDI and IPR policy is discussed in greater detail than that on trade policy. Section 6 presents the main conclusions of the paper.
Knowledge spillovers through trade
Much of the relevant literature has emphasized two aspects of the relationship between trade and technology. The first of these arises because trade alters the allocation of resources in an economy while the second is related to the role trade plays in transmitting knowledge internationally. In fact, as the literature notes, the implications of these two roles of trade are in fact quite intertwined.
Since much of the literature emphasizing trade's role in transmitting knowledge derives from closed economy models of endogenous growth, a brief digression will help put things in context. Traditional growth theory sought the explanation of economic growth in terms of accumulation of resources. Capital accumulation was seen as the major determinant of economic growth and a natural conclusion of this research was that, unless the return to capital accumulation could stay bounded away from zero, growth would peter out in the long run. A natural implication of this finding was that, over time, one should expect poor countries to eventually converge to the per capita income levels of the rich countries.
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Standard neoclassical growth models assume costless technology transfer by positing a common production function across countries. Note that the fact that chosen production techniques differ across countries is not evidence against the neoclassical assumption: when faced with different factor prices (due to differences in factor endowments), agents will typically adopt different techniques in different countries. Thus the real question is whether agents in different countries can access the global pool of technologies at the same cost. Parente and Prescott (1994) have emphasized barriers to technology adoption as a key determinant of differences in per capita income across countries. In their model, while any firm can access the underlying stock of knowledge in the world economy, the cost of such access may differ across countries due to differences in legal, regulatory, political, and social factors. Thus the argument is that some countries make it inherently costlier for their firms to adopt modern technologies and thereby 7 The evidence on convergence is weak; while some countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong did achieve enviable rates of growth, most developing countries do not seem to be on any path of convergence toward rich countries (Pritchett, 1997) .
retard the development of the entire economy. In fact, Parente and Prescott go on to suggest that trade may affect growth by lowering the barriers to technology adoption.
In contrast to neoclassical models that stress capital accumulation, the new growth theory emphasizes endogenous technological change and the accumulation of human capital (Lucas, 1988) . 8 Romer (1990) , Grossman and Helpman (1991) , Aghion and Howitt (1990) , and Anant, Segerstrom, and Dinopoulos (1991) were among the pioneers of R&D based models of economic growth. These models were able to provide a coherent framework for the Schumpeterian notion of 'creative destruction'. While they differ from each other in important ways, one underlying idea common to these models is that entrepreneurs conduct R&D to gain temporary monopoly power where such a privilege is made possible due to the provision of intellectual property rights. Grossman and Helpman (1991) provide a unifying framework for two widely used strands of R&D based endogenous growth models: the 'varieties only' model that builds on foundations laid by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , Ethier (1982), and Romer (1990) , and the `quality ladders' model developed by Aghion and Howitt (1990), Segerstrom et. al. (1991) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) . In a closed economy, growth is sustained in the `variety model' through the assumption that the creation of new products expands the knowledge stock, which then lowers the cost of innovation. Thus, as more products are invented, while the profits of subsequent innovators are lower because of increased competition (no products disappear from the market in this model), so are the costs of inventing new products. In the quality ladders model, since consumers are willing to pay a premium for higher quality products, firms always have an incentive to improve the quality of products. The important assumption that sustains growth in this model is that every successful innovation allows all firms to study the attributes of the product and then improve upon it. Patent rights restrict a firm from producing a product invented by some other firm but not from using the knowledge (created due to R&D) that is embodied in that product. Thus, as soon as a product is created, knowledge needed for its production becomes available to all and such knowledge spillovers ensure that anyone can try to invent a higher quality version of the same product.
While R&D based endogenous growth theory is quite appealing theoretically, empirical evidence does not provide a strong endorsement (Pack, 1992) . In fact, Jones (1995a, and 1995b) has explicitly tested the empirical implications of R&D based models of economic growth and found that the data reject these implications. Krugman (1979) , Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) , and Grossman and Helpman (1991) . The literature is now rather large and a full discussion requires a survey of its own (see Grossman and Helpman, 1995 ). Yet, North-South models that emphasize the product cycle nature of trade have been particularly useful for understanding international technology transfer and merit some further discussion.
The basic idea of product cycle models (for details see Grossman and Helpman, 1991) is that new products are invented in the North and due to lower relative Southern wage (endogenous in the model) firms in the South can successfully undercut Northern producers once they succeed in imitating Northern products. A typical good is initially produced in the North till either further innovation (in the quality ladders model) or successful Southern imitation (in both the variety model and the quality ladders model) makes profitable production in the North infeasible. Consequently, either production ceases all together (if product is innovated over) or shifts to the South (if imitated). Thus, prior to imitation, all products are exported by the North whereas post imitation they are imported, thereby completing the cycle. These models capture technology driven trade and have been generalized to consider technology transfer more explicitly. Its clear from the 9 Roughly speaking, scale effects imply that large economies grow faster than small economies. See Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999) for a lucid discussion of scale effects in endogenous growth models.
preceding discussion, for example, that FDI or licensing (choices available to innovators for producing in the South) were not considered in the early variants of these models.
What do R&D based models of growth imply about the effect of trade on growth? The central conclusion of this line of research literature is that much of importance hinges on whether knowledge spillovers are national or international in nature (Grossman and Helpman, 1995 Valley) suggests that spillovers may be primarily local. On the other hand, several studies find that R&D activity in a country is not strongly correlated with its own productivity growth, suggesting that results of R&D in one country may spill over substantially to other countries. Eaton and Kortum (1996) find that more than 50% of the growth in some OECD countries derives from innovation in the United States, Germany, and Japan. Yet they also report that distance inhibits the flow of ideas between countries whereas trade enhances it. In their micro-level study of the semiconductor industry, Irwin and Klenow (1994) find that learning (resulting from production) spills over as much across national borders as it does between firms in the same country. Similarly, Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe et. al. (1997) controlling the rate at which their technologies spread internationally, and for the theory of trade and innovation to be internally consistent this is almost a requirement, then it is misleading to focus 13 Using data for 87 countries, Hakura and Jaumotte (1999) find that trade indeed serves as a channel of international technology transfer to developing countries and that inter-industry trade plays a stronger role in technology transfer than intra-industry trade. Since intra-industry trade is more pervasive among developed countries than it is between developed and developing countries, an immediate implication of their findings is that developing countries will enjoy relatively less technology transfer from trade than developed countries. 14 In a response to Keller (1998), Coe and Hoffmaister (1999) raise some doubts about Keller's findings. They argue that Keller's 'random' weights are not actually random and when alternative weights are used, estimated international R&D spillovers are non-existent for the case of random weights, as suggested by theory. Using estimates of international R&D spillovers from Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe et. al. (1997) , Bayoumi, et. al. (1999) simulate the impact of changes in R&D and in exposure to trade on productivity, capital, output and consumption in a multi-country model (IMF's MULTIMOD econometric model). Their simulations indicate that R&D can affect output not only directly but also indirectly by stimulating capital investment. Incidentally, this finding is also of interest for the debate regarding the Asian growth miracle. 15 Evidence on this issue continues to come in. In a recent paper, using firm level data from the U.S. and Japan, Branstetter (1996) comes out strongly in favor of the limited (national) scope of knowledge spillovers.
primarily on the geographical scope of spillovers without giving innovators some role in that process.
Of course, the incentives of innovators are not the only determinant of the scope of knowledge spillovers. One most also consider the incentives facing potential buyers and imitators of technologies. As we will see, by and large, the existing literature in this area has not paid adequate attention to the rich choice set faced by both potential suppliers and buyers of technology. We next discuss the literature that seeks to explain the emergence of multinational firms, since such firms play a central role in international technology transfer.
Explaining FDI: Location and Mode of Production
There are two distinct questions that a firm seeking to serve foreign markets must contend with. First is the issue of location of production: is it better to produce the good in the home country and export to foreign markets(s) or is production abroad more profitable? Second, if production is to be located abroad, how should technology be transferred overseas? Firms can choose from a variety of arrangements that differ in their relative use of markets and organizations. At the one extreme lie technology transfers to wholly owned subsidiaries while at the other lie transfers to unrelated parties via technology licensing. We address each of these questions in turn.
Exports versus Production Abroad
As noted above, when serving a foreign market, a firm can choose from a menu of options. In this context, the choice between exports and FDI has received the most attention in the economics literature. Note, first that, this question assumes that exports and direct investment are substitutes for one another. Is this widely used assumption justified? A first reading of the empirical literature on the question suggests not. Most existing empirical work usually uncovers a complementary relationship between exports and foreign affiliate sales. Lipsey and Weiss (1981) is a prominent example of such research. They find that affiliate sales are positively correlated with exports at the industry level. Firm level studies such as Weiss (1984), Graham and Mutti (1991) , and Blomström et. al. (1993) also uncover a complementary relationship between trade and FDI.
Does the evidence imply that most theoretical models are flawed? 16 Perhaps not. A reasonable interpretation of the existing evidence, as suggested by Blonigen (1999) , is simply that such studies are finding net complemenatrity: aggregation bias in the data simply buries the substitution effects emphasized in theoretical models. The major contribution of Blonigen (1999) lies in using product level data since it as at this level that the substitution effect is really implied by theory. He uses data on Japanese production and exports to the US for two types of products: Existing theoretical models have also explored strategic considerations that influence the choice between exports and FDI (see Horstmann and Markusen, 1992 , Norman and Motta, 1993 , and Motta and Norman, 1996 . As is clear, the presence of trade barriers creates a tariff-jumping motive for FDI. 20 However, the preceding research highlights the interdependence of decision making between multinational firms. For example, when two firms are exporting to a foreign market, a switch from exports to FDI by one creates an incentive for FDI on the other firm's part, 16 Of course, it is easy to construct theoretical models in which exports and sales of affiliates are complementary. Introducing a vertical structure in production obviously accomplishes the task; thus most types of outsourcing which involves basic stages of production being carried out in one location and other stages such as R&D and/or marketing being done elsewhere would imply a complementary relationship between exports and FDI. 17 Such a study is particularly useful in the context of Japanese firms who import relatively large amounts of parts from Japan and seem quite unwilling to substitute between US and Japanese parts. 18 Another issue that complicates the story is endogenity of demand. Some authors have argued that the location of production may itself alter the demand function facing the foreign firm's product because consumers may expect better after sales service or commitment to the local market if the foreign firm produced the good locally. 19 The literature on intraindustry trade as derived from Dixit-Stiglitz's (1977) model may over-emphasize the role of product differentiation and consumer emphasis on variety. As Ethier (1982) noted, actual trade is in intermediate goods needed for production.
who finds itself at a competitive disadvantage (Lin and Saggi, 1999 , call this the competitive incentive for FDI).
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As far as the static choice between exports and production abroad is concerned, existing theoretical models seem reasonably well developed. However, this is a limited perspective: firms face a dynamic problem and not a one-time choice between exports and FDI. They may, and indeed do, switch between the two activities over time. Unfortunately, the literature exploring the dynamics of optimal entry strategies into foreign markets is scarce. A recent study by Roberts and Tybout (1997) , while not exploring the choice between different entry strategies does highlight the role of sunk costs in determining the dynamic behavior of exporters. Using data for Colombian manufacturing plants, Roberts and Tybout (1997) show that prior exporting experience is an important determinant of current tendency to export as well as profitability of exporting. Their findings show that sunk costs are indeed relevant for exporting behavior and that learning is subject to strong depreciation: the entry costs of a plant that has never exported do not differ significantly from plants that have not exported for more than two years.
While Roberts and Tybout (1997) do not consider other modes of serving foreign markets, their insight can be utilized in a more general context. Suppose firms also have the option of FDI.
Building on their approach, one can view the choice between exports and FDI as a choice between two different technologies, where exports entail a higher marginal cost and a lower fixed (sunk) cost than FDI. Under uncertainty, if firms do face such a cost structure, an interesting dynamic relationship between exports and FDI may emerge. Saggi (1997) builds a two-period model to examine a firm's choice between exports and FDI in the face of demand uncertainty.
First period exports yield information about demand in the foreign market. As a result, first period exports have an option value: if a significant portion of the fixed cost of FDI is sunk, it is optimal for a firm to export in the first period and do FDI iff demand abroad is large enough. Clearly, the preceding argument is not specific to demand uncertainty and can be generalized with respect to other types of uncertainty about which sales via exports can yield information. 22 Of course, 20 Bhagwati et. al. (1987 have even argued that the mere threat of future trade restrictions may lead to anticipatory investment (termed `quid pro quo' investment) by foreign firms. 21 An old tradition in the management literature describes the interdependence between the decision making of large multinationals as `follow the leader' behavior. 22 Similarly, exports and initial FDI may be strongly complementary for another reason: firms are not likely to shift the entire production process to a new location immediately. If initial investment is found to be profitable, local sourcing may reduce the need for importing intermediates. Over time, such substitution effects may become stronger and the complementarity between exports and FDI may become weaker generalizing the preceding argument to the case of multiple firms also creates the possibility of informational externalities amongst investors: experience of one firm may impart lessons to others.
Such externalities may be particularly relevant for FDI into many developing and formerly communist countries (China and much of Eastern Europe) that have recently altered their policies in a remarkable manner. As a result, firms from industrialized countries have gained access to hitherto closed markets and to many cheap locations of production for the first time. But at the same time, they have little prior experience in operating in these new environments. This lack of experience coupled with the complexity surrounding the FDI decision implies that firms seeking to invest in these markets can learn valuable lessons from the successes and failures of others. 23 In their survey of Japanese firms planning investments in Asia, Kinoshita and Mody (1997) found that information, both private and public, plays an important role in determining investment decisions. They argue that information regarding many operational conditions (such as functioning of labor markets, literacy and productivity of the labor force, timely availability as well as quality of inputs etc.) may not be available publicly. In such a scenario, information is either gathered through one's own direct experience or through the experience of others. Thus, present investment is a function of one's own investment as well as those of rival investors. Their empirical analysis finds that a firm's current investment is strongly affected by its own past behavior as well as investments by its rivals.
While the degree of fixed/sunk costs may play a role in determining the choice between licensing, joint ventures, and FDI, other considerations are probably more important. A new foreign plant is the primary contributing factor behind higher fixed/sunk costs of FDI relative to exports, and this factor is unlikely to be of first order importance in determining the choice between different entry modes that are distinguished primarily by the extent of ownership.
Mode of Operation: Licensing, Joint Venture or FDI?
A major question in the theory of the multinational firm is when and why firms choose to Markusen (1995) and Caves (1996) . 24 Here, we restrict attention to the central conclusions of this line of research, particularly those that relate to technology transfer.
Recently, Markusen and Maskus (1999) have suggested that the literature that attempts to link the emergence of multinational firms with firm and country level characteristics can be understood to emerge from a common underlying model -the `knowledge-capital' model. 25 As Markusen (1998) argues, this model rests on the fact that knowledge capital has a public good property: it can be utilized in multiple locations simultaneously. Thus, any innovation can then be fruitfully applied at multiple plants dispersed all over the world, giving rise to horizontal multinational firms. Markusen and Maskus (1999) show that there is indeed strong empirical support for this horizontal model of multinationals.
How does the knowledge-capital model explain internalization? Once again the public good nature of knowledge occupies a central role. If licensees (or local partners under a joint venture) can get access to the multinational's proprietary knowledge, the value of such knowledge can be dissipated either because of increased competition (Ethier and Markusen, 1991 , and Saggi, 1996 or because the local partner has inadequate incentives to protect the multinational's reputation (Horstmann and Markusen, 1987) . The incentive to prevent the dissipation of knowledge based assets is reflected in the fact that multinationals transfer technologies of new vintage via direct investment, preferring to license or transfer their older technologies via joint ventures (see Mansfield and Romeo, 1980) .
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In recent empirical paper, Smarzynska (1999a) focuses on intra-industry differences in R&D intensity as a determinant of mode of entry chosen by firms investing in eastern European countries. Like past work, this study finds that a firm's R&D expenditure is negatively related to the probability of a joint venture and positively related to greenfield entry. Furthermore, a firm's R&D expenditure relative to the rest of the industry is positively correlated with the probability of greenfield entry in high technology sectors. More interestingly, however, in low technology (1999) for a duopoly model in which the firm first to switch to FDI from exporting confers a positive externality on the subsequent investor by lowering its fixed cost of FDI. 24 There exists a vast literature in the field of international business that deals with some of the very questions posed above. By and large, this literature involves empirical tests of the OLI (ownership, location, and internalization) paradigm formulated by John Dunning. To limit scope, this literature is discussed only to the extent that it offers new insights with respect to the economics of multinational firms. See Caves (1996) for a relatively recent survey of this literature. 25 Papers that deal directly with technology transfer are: Markusen (1987 and , and Ethier and Markusen (1991) . See also Markusen (1998) for a good overview.
sectors, higher relative R&D expenditure by a firm actually increases the likelihood of a joint venture rather than a greenfield entry. Thus, a firm's R&D expenditure relative to others in an industry and the aggregate R&D expenditure of the industry relative to other industries may both interact in subtle ways to influence the choice between alternative entry modes. Smarzysnka (1999a) argues that protecting one's technology is of greater concern in high technology industries, thereby encouraging technological leaders to adopt direct entry. However, it is also possible that in industries characterized by a fast pace of technological change, any technology leakage will hurt a firm for only a short period of time. 27 Furthermore, the formation of joint ventures will be easier in relatively mature host industries since suitable local partners can be found more easily. Thus, her results call for a careful interpretation but raise some interesting possibilities and further questions.
Foreign firms may not be the only one's that have valuable information that may be subject to dissipation due to diffusion to other firms. Horstmann and Markusen (1996) argue that a potential licensee in the host country may have better information about local demand and can use this information to extract rents from the licenser. Such agency costs can also be utilized to explain the dynamics of optimal entry modes. In his studies of British multinationals, Nicholas (1982 and 1983) found that eighty eight percent initially sold their products via a contract with a local agent before converting to directly owned sales or production branches. Furthermore, the decision to terminate the licensing arrangement was based on a desire to avoid agency costs, and once the multinational had acquired the information it needed via its alliance with the local partner, continuing the agency relationship was no longer attractive. Similarly, in their survey of Japanese multinationals in Australia, Nicholas et. al. (1994) found that sixty percent used a local agent before making a direct investment and sixty nine percent exported to Australia before making a direct investment of any sort. One can view such temporary licensing as a method of information acquisition on the part of the foreign firm, as opposed to the local firm seeking superior production technology.
In Horstmann and Markusen's (1996) model, when the multinational firm's fixed cost of investment are high relative to the agent's and there is risk of large losses due to low demand, the multinational opts for an initial licensing contract that becomes permanent ex post in case of low 26 Of course, it may be easier to trade via the market when technology is older since asymmetric information problems are likely to be less severe. 27 Theory does not provide a clear support for her terminology (those doing more R&D are deemed technological leaders). Firms that have been driven out of the market may have a stronger incentive to demand. Their analysis can be applied to examine the choice between a joint venture and a wholly owned subsidiary, except that cost uncertainty may be more relevant for this scenario than demand uncertainty. For example, if the productivity of foreign labor is in doubt, forming a joint venture may present a low (fixed) cost option. If labor productivity turns out to be high, an acquisition of the foreign partner may be optimal ex post, resulting in the establishment of a wholly owned subsidiary.
By and large, however, dynamic issues remain under explored in the literature. While the comparative statics of existing models help gain some partial intuition about forces that are important for dynamic choice, such an approach is a poor substitute for explicit dynamic modeling. Yet another confirmation of the strong role FDI plays in transmitting technology internationally comes from the inter-industry distribution of FDI. It is well known that multinational firms are concentrated in industries that exhibit a high ratio of R&D relative to sales and a large share of technical and professional workers (Markusen, 1995) . In fact, it is commonly argued that, multinationals rely heavily on intangible assets such as superior technology to successfully compete with local firms who are better acquainted with the host country environment.
By encouraging FDI, developing countries hope not only to import more efficient foreign technologies but also to generate technological spillovers for local firms. Not surprisingly, there exists a large literature that tries to determine whether or not host countries enjoy spillovers from FDI. One needs to be clear about the meaning of word `spillover': a distinction can be made between pecuniary externalities (that result from the effects of FDI on market structure) and other pure externalities (such as the facilitation of technology adoption) that may accompany FDI.
A strict definition of spillovers would only count the latter and this is the definition employed in this paper.
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The central difficulty is that spillovers, as defined above, will not leave a paper trail --they are externalities that the market fails to take into account. Nevertheless, several studies have attempted the difficult task of quantifying spillovers and we discuss them below. But a prior question is what are the potential channels through which such spillovers may arise? 29 At a general level, the literature suggests the following potential channels of spillovers:
Demonstration effects: local firms may adopt technologies introduced by multinational firms through imitation or reverse engineering.
Labor turnover: workers trained or previously employed by the multinational may transfer important information to local firms by switching employers or may contribute to technology diffusion by starting their own firms. 28 In other words, if FDI spurs innovation in the domestic industry by increasing competition, we do not view that as a `spillover' from FDI but rather a benefit enjoyed by the host country that works its way through the price mechanism and the market equilibrium. Of course, it is very difficult to empirically isolate the pure externalities from FDI from its other effects that work through the market. Furthermore, policy ought to be based on the aggregate effect of FDI on welfare, not just on the extent of positive externalities from FDI. 29 In fact, a more difficult question can be asked: is it reasonable to even expect spillovers to occur from FDI? It seems natural to assume that multinationals have much to gain from preventing the spread of their technologies to potential rivals. A possible exception to this argument arises when technologies may diffuse to potential suppliers of inputs or buyers of goods and services sold by multinationals.
Vertical linkages: multinationals may transfer technology to firms that are potential suppliers of intermediate goods or buyers of their own products.
Let us examine each of these channels in some detail, discussing empirical evidence wherever it exists.
Facilitation of technology adoption
In its simplest form, the demonstration effect argument states that exposure to the superior technology of multinational firms may lead local firms to update their own production methods. The main point here is that in the absence of FDI, it may simply be too costly for local firms to acquire the necessary information for adopting new technologies if they are not first introduced in the local economy by multinationals (and hence demonstrated to succeed in the local environment). Incidentally, the demonstration effect argument relates well to the point made by Parente and Prescott (1994) Since the demonstration effect argument is largely an industry-level argument, relating industry level variation in R&D expenditures by local firms to the extent of FDI is one method of checking whether local adoption efforts are encouraged via FDI. Of course, such an exercise would have to control for the effect of FDI on market structure and this seems rather difficult. To the best of my knowledge, a convincing empirical exercise of this type has not been performed.
Instead, the existing literature has focused on the effects of FDI on total factor productivity in local firms. We turn to this next.
Empirical evidence on spillovers
Early efforts in search of spillovers from FDI proceeded by relating the inter-industry variation in productivity to the extent of FDI. Examples of this research are Caves (1974) , competitive firms have a stronger incentive to invest in R&D that results in innovations that replace existing technology. 31 A related model is presented in Wang and Blomstrom (1992) . In their duopoly model with differentiated goods, a multinational transfers technology to its subsidiary given that the local firm can learn from the new technologies introduced. Learning occurs both through costless technology spillovers (as in the contagion effects first emphasized by Findlay, 1978) as well as through costly investments made by the local firm. The most interesting implication of the model is that technology transfer via FDI is positively related to the level of the local firm's learning investment. This result suggests that multinationals respond to local competition by introducing newer technologies faster. 32 Huizinga (1994) models a multinational's incentive for technology transfer where it faces risk of competition caused by expropriation by the host country government. The main result is that the multinational responds to this risk by lowering the quality of technology transfer even when such transfers are costless.
Globerman (1979), Blomström and Hakan (1983) , and Blomström (1986) . By and large, these studies find that sectors with higher level of foreign involvement (as measured by share or labor force in the industry employed by foreign firms or the extent of foreign ownership), tend to have higher productivity, or higher productivity growth, or both. The fact that these studies involved data from different countries (Australia for the Caves study, Canada for Globerman, and Mexico for Blomström) lends a strong degree of robustness to this positive correlation between the level of foreign involvement and productivity in a sector. Of course, the trouble is that correlation is not causation and as noted by Aitken and Harrison (1999) self-selection problem may also plague plant level studies: the more productive plants may be the one's that attract foreign investment. 33 Nevertheless, if plant level studies fail to find a significant relationship between foreign involvement and productivity, the self-selection problem cannot be important, unless the argument is that foreign firms seek out plants with low productivity and then bring them up to par with other, more efficient local firms so that in the end, no significant productivity differential between foreign and local firms is found! This argument may be farfetched but could make sense as follows. Suppose local plants with very low productivity are relatively under-valued by local agents since the skills (technology, modern management etc.) needed to bring them up to speed are in short supply locally. In such a scenario, such plants would be attractive to foreign investors who may be able to generate productivity improvements that simply cannot be achieved by local agents. 33 A recent paper by Clerides et. al. (1999) finds support in favor of the self selection hypothesis in the context of exporting: it is the more productive firms that self select into exporting.
What do empirical plant level studies find with respect to spillovers from FDI? The first study to employ a comprehensive data set at the level of the individual firm over several years was Haddad and Harrison (1993) . The data for this study came from an annual survey of all manufacturing firms in Morocco. The most fundamental result of this study was that foreign firms exhibit higher levels of total factor productivity (TFP) but their rate of TFP growth was lower than domestic firms. As the authors note, at first glance, such a finding suggests that perhaps there was some sort of convergence between domestic and foreign firms. However, this was not the case. While there was a level effect of foreign investment on the TFP of domestic firms, such an effect was missing for the growth rate of TFP of domestic firms. Secondly, when sectors were divided into high and low tech, the effect of FDI at the sectoral level was found to be more positive in low-tech sectors. The authors interpret this result as indicative of the lack of absorptive capacity on the part of local firms in the high-tech sector, where they may be further behind multinationals and unable to absorb foreign technology.
Another attempt to measure spillovers from FDI was undertaken by Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996) . This study approached the issue of technology spillovers from FDI through the labor market. The idea was that technology spillovers should increase the marginal product of labor and this should show up in the wages for workers. The study employed data collected from surveys of manufacturing firms in Venezuela, Mexico, and the United States. For both Mexico and Venezuela, a higher share of foreign employment was associated with higher overall wages for both skilled and unskilled workers. Furthermore, royalty payments were also highly correlated with wages. Most importantly, there was no positive impact of FDI on wages of workers employed by domestic firms. In fact, the authors report a small a negative effect and finally, the overall effect (for the entire industry) was positive. These findings are to be contrasted with those for the United States, where a larger share of foreign firms in employment was associated with both a higher average wage as well as higher wages in domestic establishments.
When the findings of the second study are put into the context of previous work, it is clear that wage spillovers (from foreign to domestic firms) are associated with higher productivity in domestic plants. Conversely, absence of wage spillovers appears to accompany the existence of productivity differentials between domestic and foreign firms. Why might this be so? Any serious explanation of this association requires that the one must study the interaction of the market for labor and goods. Glass and Saggi (1999) develop a model to capture this interaction and their findings are discussed in the sub-section on labor turnover below.
The most recent study on the issue of spillovers from FDI is Aitken and Harrison (1999) .
This study uses annual census data on over 4000 Venezuelan firms. Since each plant was observed over a period of time, the self-selection problem inflicting past sectoral level studies (i.e.
FDI goes to the more productive sectors) could be avoided. The authors found a positive relationship between foreign equity participation and plant performance implying that foreign participation does indeed benefit plants that receive such participation. However, this own plant effect was robust for only small plants i.e. those plants that employed less than 50 employees. For larger plants, foreign participation resulted in no significant improvement in productivity relative to domestic plants. More interestingly, productivity in domestic plants declined when foreign investment increased. In other words, they found evidence of negative spillovers from FDI and suggested that such negative spillovers could result from a market stealing effect: foreign competition may have forced domestic firms to lower output and thereby forgo economies of scale. Note that if loss in output is large enough, local plants may have lower productivity despite enjoying some sort of technology spillovers. Nevertheless, on balance, the authors found that the effect of FDI on the productivity of the entire industry was weakly positive. They also noted in a footnote that similar results were obtained for Indonesia except that the positive effect on own plants was stronger whereas the negative effect on domestic plants was weaker, suggesting a stronger overall positive effect for Indonesia's case.
In a recent paper, Djankov and Hoekman (1999) also found a negative spillover effect of FDI on purely domestic firms in Czech industry. Interestingly, however, when joint ventures were excluded from the sample and attention was restricted to the impact of majority-owned foreign affiliates (i.e., FDI) on all other firms in an industry (including joint ventures), the negative effect lost statistical significance. The authors report that survey questionnaires reveal that joint venture firms invested significantly more in new technologies than purely domestic firms did. The authors suggest that purely domestic firms might have lacked the ability to absorb the technologies introduced by foreign firms (due to their lower R&D efforts).
Overall, several studies have cast doubt on the view that FDI generates positive spillovers for local firms. But such findings need not imply that host countries have nothing significant to gain (or must lose) from FDI. The point is that reallocation of resources that accompanies the entry of foreign firms may not be immediate. Domestic firms should be expected to suffer from an increase in competition; in fact part of benefit of inward FDI is that it can help weed out relatively inefficient domestic firms. Resources released in this process will be put to better use by either foreign firms with superior technologies, or efficient new entrants (both domestic and foreign), or by some other sectors of the economy. Existing studies of spillovers may not cover a long enough period of time to be able to accurately determine how FDI affects turnover rates (entry and exit).
Furthermore, such horizontal studies are further limited by design since they cannot clarify linkages and spillovers that may result from FDI in industries other than the one in which FDI occurs (see more on this below). Before considering this issue, we discuss what is perhaps a crucial channel of internal technology diffusion but has failed to receive much attention in the literature.
Labor turnover
While direct imitation and reverse engineering have been extensively studied as channels of inter-firm technology diffusion, the role of labor turnover has been rather neglected. Labor turnover differs from these channels because knowledge embodied in workers moves across firms only through the physical movement of workers. The relative importance of labor turnover is difficult to establish for obvious reasons: one needs to track individuals who have worked for multinationals regarding their future job choices and then determine their impact on the productivity of new employers. Thus, there exist few empirical studies that attempt to measure the magnitude of labor turnover from multinationals to local firms. To the best of my knowledge, there exist no empirical studies that attempt to measure the role such turnover plays in improving productivity in local firms.
The available evidence on labor turnover itself is mixed. For example, while a study of Kenyan industries by Gershenberg (1987) finds limited evidence of labor turnover from multinationals to local Kenyan firms, several other studies document substantial labor turnover from multinational to local firms. The World Investment Report of 1992 discusses the case of Bangladesh's garment industry in some detail (see also Rhee, 1990 Glass and Saggi (1999b) . The rationale of their model is as follows.
Since superior technology is one of the key intangible assets that permit multinationals to successfully compete with local firms, multinationals have an incentive to limit diffusion of their technology to local rivals. An effective method of limiting technology diffusion is to curtail labor turnover by offering higher wages than local rivals offer. Thus, if multinationals are observed paying higher wages than local firms are, the wage premiums paid by a multinational can provide a rough estimate of the value it places on the knowledge it transfers to its workers. The more interesting point is that such a premium may either exceed or fall short of the benefit the local economy would enjoy, if the multinational were to sit back and allow its workers to leave. Note that if the multinational must raise wages if it wants to restrict technology diffusion to local firms and the wage premium has no necessary relation to the social value of the knowledge embodied in workers, technology diffusion is not necessarily optimal for the local economy. Thus, policies designed to encourage technology transfer do not always raise welfare of the recipient country.
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Local competition policy may also effect labor turnover. For example, according to Bulgaria's competition law, no person is permitted to join the management of a competing firm 35 Local investment climate may be such that workers looking to leave multinationals in search of new opportunities (or other local entrepreneurs) find it unprofitable to start their own companies implying the only alternative opportunity is to join existing local firms. The presence of weak local competitors probably goes hand in hand with the lack of entrepreneurial efforts since both may result from the underlying structure of the economic environment. 36 It is worth relating these results to those of Das (1987) whose investigation of the effects of technology transfer reveals that local firms may lose from such transfers even though the local economy does not.
operating in the same line of business as the person's original employer for the first three years after leaving an enterprise (see Hoekman and Djankov, 1997 
Vertical linkages and technology transfer
For quite some time now, it has been recognized that multinationals may benefit the host economy via the backward and forward linkages that they generate. However, merely documenting extensive linkages between multinational and local suppliers or buyers is insufficient to argue that net benefits accrue to the local economy as a result of FDI. Rodriguez Clare (1995) develops a formal model of linkages and shows that multinationals improve welfare only if they generate linkages over and beyond those generated by local firms they displace. Yet, the question of relevance here is whether the generation of linkages is expected to result in technology diffusion. 37 While analytical modeling of such issues is scarce, there does exist limited empirical evidence in support of the view that multinationals are involved in vertical technology transfers (Lall, 1980) . Even more interesting is the possibility that such vertical transfers, when accompanied with spillovers, may lead to interaction between upstream and downstream multinational firms that encourages industrial development.
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In a recent paper, Pack and Saggi (1999) 
Spillovers from FDI: a recapitulation
A difficult challenge facing the optimistic view regarding technology spillovers from FDI is to explain how such spillovers can ever be in the interest of the multinational firms. Clearly, under most circumstances, multinationals would rather limit diffusion in the local economy. In fact, the heart of the theory that seeks to explain the emergence of multinationals is that such firms are able to successfully compete with local firms precisely because they possess superior technologies, management, and marketing. Why then would multinationals not take actions to ensure that such advantages do not diffuse to local competitors? Part of the answer must lie in the fact that such actions are costly and may even entail externalities between multinationals. Suppose a costly action (such as litigation in local courts to enforce IPR protection) can indeed help limit loss of knowledge capital for a multinational. A difficulty arises if all potential multinationals benefit from the curtailment of technology diffusion whereas the costs fall on only the one who takes legal action. Thus, the public good nature of such actions suggest that developing countries hosting multinationals may expect the rivalry amongst such firms to indeed result in some degree of technology diffusion. Of course, the preceding argument also overstates the case a bit: some loss of knowledge will result despite all precautions. Nevertheless, the general message is clear: multinationals can take actions to limit diffusion, and while making their decisions regarding where to set up subsidiaries, the expected costs of technology diffusion will enter their calculus of profit maximization.
That being said, entry of multinationals may indeed be beneficial for host countries even though it fails to result in much in the way of spillovers for local firms. In fact, the preceding discussion suggests that spillovers to local firms that directly compete with the multinational would indeed be the most elusive of benefits that host countries may expect to enjoy from FDI. Second, the very act of curtailment of spillovers, may sometimes imply that local agents other than domestic competitors of multinationals (for example local workers) may enjoy positive externalities 39 One implication of their analysis is that fully integrated multinational firms may be more averse to technology diffusion than firms that are involved in international arms length arrangements since they have little to gain from diffusion.
from FDI. If so, the total welfare effect of FDI on local welfare may be positive despite the lack of technology spillovers.
Lastly, we should note that spillovers may be of an entirely different nature: some empirical evidence indicates that multinational firms who penetrate foreign markets reduce entry costs for other potential exporters (see Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison, 1997) . 40 Such spillovers may result from informational externalities and are more likely to lower fixed costs rather than marginal costs of production.
FDI and growth
Regardless of the channel through which technology spillovers occur, the fact that FDI often involves capital inflows along with technology transfer implies that one would expect a positive impact of FDI on growth in the host country. Yet there are several important caveats to this assertion. First of all, a positive correlation between the extent of FDI and economic growth in cross-country regressions may simply reflect the fact that FDI is attracted to countries that are expected to grow faster simply because it yields higher returns there. Thus, the causation could run from growth to FDI and simultaneous equation system estimation may be needed to resolve the issue. Second, multinationals often raise the required capital in the host country and in such a scenario, capital inflows associated with FDI may not be substantial. An optimistic view of FDI would then look to technology transfer and/or spillovers as the mechanism through which FDI may affect growth.
In a recent paper, Glass and Saggi (1999a) examine the question of spillovers from FDI in a product cycle model. In their North-South model, the demonstration/proximity argument is formalized as follows: Southern firms are assumed to be able to imitate multinationals located in the South at a lower cost than firms located in the North. However, as they point out, multinational firms are also stronger competitors than firms that produce only in the North since multinationals produce in the same low wage location as potential imitators. Their model delivers the surprising result that a faster flow of FDI increases the aggregate rate of technology transfer to the South only if local firms lack the ability to imitate firms located in the North (i.e. if geographical proximity is a pre-requisite for imitation). If firms in the North can be imitated, FDI does not alter aggregate 40 Needless to say, our discussion of vertical technology transfer is also relevant here.
technology transfer since imitation focusing on firms located in the North slows down with a hastening of imitation targeting multinationals.
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In a recent, comprehensive paper, Borensztein et. al. (1998) utilize data on FDI flows from industrialized countries to sixty nine developing countries to test the effect of FDI on growth in a cross-country regression framework. Their findings are as follows. First, FDI contributes more to domestic growth than domestic investment, suggesting that it is indeed a vehicle of technology transfer. Second, FDI is more productive than domestic investment only when the host country has a minimum threshold stock of human capital. The latter finding is especially interesting since it clarifies when exactly FDI should be expected to effect growth.
Using cross section data from forty six developing countries, Balasubramanyam et. al. (1996) also investigate the effect of FDI on growth in developing countries. They report two main findings. First, growth enhancing effects of FDI are stronger in countries that pursued an policy of export promotion rather than import substitution, suggesting that the trade policy regime is an important determinant of the effects of FDI. Second, they find that, in countries with export promoting trade regimes, FDI has a stronger effect on growth than domestic investment. Both Xu (1999) provides yet another confirmation of the argument that, in the absence of adequate human capital, technology transfer from FDI may fail to increase productivity growth in the host country. Using date on outward FDI from the United States to forty countries, Xu (1999) 41 Note that the model assumes that imitation of multinationals is always feasible; in this sense, a threshold level of absorptive/imitative capacity is assumed on the part of Southern firms. 42 Using a model quite different from that of Keller's, Glass and Saggi (1998) focus on the issue of the quality of technology transferred via FDI. They argue that investment in imitation by host country firms generate the necessary knowledge (or skill) foundation for FDI, and thus factors that promote imitation can promote a higher quality mix of FDI. While Keller's model stresses that a country's stock of human capital effectively constrains its ability to take advantage of foreign technologies, Glass and Saggi (1998) emphasize that indigenous technological capability in an industry effectively constrains a country's ability to host foreign technology. Thus the latter paper takes a more disaggregated view of the constraints on technology transfer relative to the former although they make similar points. For example, a country may have a fair amount of human capital in the aggregate but may lack the technological sophistication in any particular industry to be able to host high quality FDI.
finds that technology transfer from FDI contributes to productivity growth in developed countries but not in lesser developed countries because the latter lack adequate human capital. Incidentally, as Xu (1999) notes, FDI may contribute to productivity growth due to reasons other than technology transfer. Thus, a statistically significant coefficient on some measure of FDI in a productivity growth equation does not necessarily imply that technology transfer is the mechanism through which FDI contributes to productivity growth. Xu measures the technology transfer intensity of MNE affiliates by their spending on royalties and license fees as a share of their gross output and estimates that of the total effect of trade (via R&D spillovers) and FDI (via technology transfer) on productivity growth in developed countries, forty one percent is due to technology transfer. 43 Xu's results for developed countries confirm the findings of Barrell and Pain (1997) who find that FDI has a positive impact on technological change in West Germany and United Kingdom.
The role of policy
What does existing literature tell us about the role policy plays in process of international technology transfer? Clearly, the range of policies that can be considered is rather large. We restrict attention to trade, FDI, and IPR policy.
Trade policy
While the literature on trade policy is voluminous, the interaction between protection and technology transfer has not received significant attention. In fact, most existing models, treat the process of technology transfer in a rather rudimentary way and have focused instead on other aspects of the problem that are interesting in their own right, but not of central concern for this paper. Below, a few prominent examples of this line of research are discussed. Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995) examine a domestic firm's incentives for technology adoption given the existence of a superior technology that has already been adopted by a foreign rival. The cost of adoption is assumed to decline over time and the main interest is in examining how the nature (tariff versus quota) and the duration (temporary versus permanent) of trade protection influence the domestic firm's incentive for technology adoption. The most interesting result in the paper is that temporary protection (i.e. protection that is removed upon successful adoption by the domestic firm) actually delays the date of technology adoption.
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The literature has also investigated the effect of trade protection in models of R&D based models of endogenous growth Helpman, 1991 and , are excellent references).
As can be expected from models in which increasing returns, imperfect competition, and externalities play a central role, results depend upon the details of a particular model and require careful interpretation. To the extent one can draw a general conclusion from such a complex literature, it is that the literature does not provide an unconditional argument against trade protection. As emphasized in section 2, conclusions hinge dramatically on the scope of knowledge spillovers: international knowledge spillovers strongly tilt the balance in favor of free trade whereas national spillovers create a role for policy intervention that can combat path dependence resulting from historical accident. For example, if productivity improvements depend only upon a country's own R&D, a case can be made for policies that ensure that industries in which such improvements occur at a rapid rate are not all located elsewhere.
In a recent interesting paper, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (forthcoming) develop a specific-factor variant of the `quality ladders' model of endogenous growth without scale effects and examine the consequences of contingent protection (tariffs imposed on imports whenever domestic firms lose their technological leadership to foreign firms who successfully innovate over them). Their approach is interesting because protection in the real world is usually not marginal (for example, antidumping duties may be levied on foreign firms with the explicit goal of providing sufficient relief to domestic industry). Somewhat interestingly, they find that tariffs that allow domestic firms to capture the domestic market are positively related to the global rate of technological change in the short run.
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44 In a related paper, Miyagiwa and Ohno (forthcoming) , show that if temporary protection is credible, it may indeed increase R&D relative to free trade. On the other hand, if the domestic firm expects that protection will be removed early should innovation occur before the pre-announced terminal date of protection, it invests less in R&D under protection relative to free trade. Similarly, as first emphasized by Matsuyama (1990) , if the domestic firm expects protection to be extended in case of no innovation by terminal date, its investment incentives are marred by protection. 45 Grossman and Helpman (1991) also analyze the effects of tariff protection in a two-country quality ladders model. However, unlike Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, they only analyze tariffs that are too small to allow domestic firms to capture the market. Both models assume Bertrand competition on the product market so that a low quality firm can monopolize the market only if a tariff of sufficient magnitude is imposed on higher quality imports. A small tariff can extract rents from foreign firms but fails to protect domestic firms who have been innovated over by foreign firms. It should be noted that Dinopoulos and Segerstrom's analysis assumes that both countries adopt symmetric.
FDI Policies
There is no simple way of describing the policy environment that faces multinationals in developing countries today and indeed this has almost always been the case. (Layton, 1982) . South Korea's experience has also been quite similar.
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What, if any, is the rationale behind policies that discourage FDI? Pack and Saggi (1997) argue that by prohibiting FDI and placing other restrictions on the conduct of multinationals, government policies in many countries may have effectively weakened the bargaining position of foreign firms. They note that in Japan, MITI actively restricted many local firms from participating as potential buyers for this reason. But why treat technology licensing more favorably relative to FDI? Saggi (1999) suggests that the answer to this may have something to do with encouraging technological development of indigenous firms.
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46 Ozawa (1974) provides a rich description of the role imported technology and local R&D (aimed at facilitating absorption of foreign technology) played in Japan's economic development. 47 For example, while annual inflows of licensed technology increased steadily during the 70s and 80s, FDI inflows into South Korea, which were always relatively low, stagnated during 1978-1983 whereas annual inflows of licensed technology as measured by royalty payments increased steadily during the 70s and 80s (Sakong, 1993) . This slowdown of FDI into South Korea was partially a result of restrictive FDI policies instituted by the Korean government during that period. See also Hobday (1996) for further details on South Korea's experience. 48 This paper develops a two-period model where a foreign firm chooses between FDI and technology licensing. The key assumption is that licensing results in greater transfer of know-how to the local firm than does FDI, under which it must compete with the subsidiary of the multinational firm. The main result is that the local firm would have the strongest incentive for innovation if the foreign firm were to follow initial Sometimes policy has also favored joint ventures relative to wholly owned subsidiaries of multinationals. 49 Why might this be so? Of course, an immediate possibility is that all such policies simply reflect protectionism: large public firms or hitherto protected private firms may not be able to compete with multinationals and are able to secure protection through the political process.
However, is it also possible that joint ventures (as well as technology licensing) lead to more local involvement and therefore greater technology spillovers to local agents? Blomström and Sjoholm (1999) address this question in a recent empirical paper. Using plant level data for 1991 for all
Indonesian establishments with more than 20 employees, this study focuses on two main questions. First, do establishments with minority and majority ownership (i.e. joint ventures versus wholly owned subsidiaries) differ in terms of their (labor) productivity levels? Second, does the degree of technology spillovers vary with the extent of foreign ownership? Clearly, the second question is crucial for our purposes. The results of this study are interesting. First, as in many other previous studies, labor productivity is found to be higher in establishments with foreign equity than in purely domestic firms. Second, the extent of total foreign production is positively associated with productivity of domestic firms, suggesting some sort of spillovers from FDI. And third, the degree of foreign ownership does not seem to affect either the productivity of firms that get foreign equity or the extent of spillovers to the domestic sector. Thus these findings do not support the hypothesis that joint ventures differ substantially from wholly owned subsidiaries. Yet the findings are puzzling: clearly the degree of foreign participation seems to matter in that plants with no foreign investment are less productive. Perhaps, the results suggest some sort of threshold effects, beyond a certain degree of foreign ownership, additional foreign equity does not affect productivity or spillovers.
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As noted earlier, the work by Djankov and Hoekman (1999) also uncovers an interesting role for joint ventures and suggests that such enterprises may have greater ability to absorb licensing by direct investment. However, in equilibrium, the foreign firm never adopts such a course of action. Therefore, the model provides some insight into the frequently expressed preference for licensing over direct investment. 49 The Chinese government has been particularly interventionist in technology transactions and has encouraged FDI in the form of joint ventures. While wholly owned subsidiaries are not prohibited, the policy environment favors joint ventures over such enterprises. 50 The authors do not report the minimum level of foreign equity (for those plants that do get foreign equity) in their sample. Also, one must keep in mind that the study only measures labor productivity and treats some important endogenous variables as exogenous. Overall, it seems fair to say that the question remains an open one. Several earlier studies (Mansfield and Romeo, 1980 , for example) have documented that technologies transferred to wholly owned subsidiaries are of a newer vintage than licensed technologies or foreign technologies than purely domestic firms. Hoekman and Saggi (1999) Kabiraj and Marjit, 1995, and Saggi, 1996 for relevant theoretical models). 51 One may speculate that domestic content protection policies for example hope to involve more local firms and therefore generate greater spillovers. However, there is no formal model or empirical evidence that supports this position. 52 See Barry and Bradley (1997) for details regarding Ireland's experience with FDI. Both favorable policies (reduced taxes and trade barriers, investment grants etc.) as well as strong fundamentals (such as infrastructure, educated labor force etc.) seem to have played a role in attracting export-catering FDI to Ireland. The strong performance of the Irish economy since the mid-1980s is attributable to both strong fundamentals as well as significant FDI inflows into Ireland.
Intellectual property rights protection
Common sense suggests that if any policy variable should affect international technology transfer, it ought to be the host country's intellectual property rights (IPRs) regime. The theoretical literature has investigated the affect of IPR enforcement on technology transfer and FDI in several endogenous growth models. 53 To limit the scope of the discussion, I omit models in which technology transfer does not play a central role. Several of the papers are linked via their use of the two models used intensively by Grossman and Helpman (1991) . Before turning to these, I discuss the work of Taylor (1994) since it differs from the other papers in that it employs a model of endogenous technological change and transfer with Ricardian features. Taylor examines two scenarios: one in which IPR enforcement is symmetric (applies to innovators regardless of country of origin) across the two regions and one in which it is asymmetric (only domestic innovators are protected). While his analysis is conducted under the assumption of costless technology transfer and equal productivity in R&D in the two countries, his results hold even when both assumptions are dropped making it possible to apply them to a North-South setting. 54 His major result is that asymmetric protection of IPRs distorts the pattern of both trade in goods as well as R&D and lowers the global rate of growth.
Interpreting the exogenous rate of imitation as a proxy for the level of IPR enforcement in the South, Helpman (1993) shows that a decline in the intensity of imitation promotes FDI (with innovation exogenous). 55 However, the major contribution of Helpman's work lies in providing the first detailed welfare analysis of IPR enforcement in the South (as measured by an exogenous decline in the rate of imitation) in a dynamic general equilibrium growth model. He shows that a strengthening of IPR protection is not in the interest of the South and that imitation may even benefit the North provided the rate of imitation is not too fast. Lai (1998) extends the Helpman model to allow for FDI and shows that innovation is promoted along with FDI. The common weakness of both models is that stronger IPR enforcement is modeled as an exogenous decline in the rate of imitation. Nevertheless, Helpman's model is a tour de force in that it specifies clearly 53 In a strategic, partial equilibrium model, Vishwasrao (1995) argues that the lack of adequate enforcement of technology transfer agreements may encourage FDI relative to licensing. In her screening model, depending upon the type of the licensee, licensing may or may not lead to imitation. The trade-off between FDI and licensing is that FDI avoids risk of imitation at the expense of higher production costs. 54 A subtle qualification that must be made: symmetric versus asymmetric treatment implies both countries adopting one policy as opposed to another. Incentives for unilateral adoption of a symmetric policy are not analyzed in Taylor's model. 55 Krugman (1979) addressed the issue as well, although his model had a greater degree of exogenity than Helpman's.
the alternative channels via which a strengthening of Southern IPR protection affects world welfare.
In a recent paper, Yang and Maskus (1999) The main contribution of Glass and Saggi (1999c) is that they treat stronger IPR protection as an endogenous decline in imitation due to increased imitation costs (stemming from stricter uniqueness requirements) where Southern imitation targets both multinationals producing in the South and purely Northern firms producing in the North. 56 They find that FDI actually decreases with a strengthening of Southern IPR protection because an increase in the cost of imitation crowds out FDI through tighter Southern resource scarcity. Less efficient imitation absorbs more resources despite the reduction in the rate of imitation due to the reduced profitability of imitation. Additionally, the contraction in FDI tightens resource scarcity in the North: increased production leaves fewer resources for innovation, so the rate of innovation falls.
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It is worth emphasizing that if strengthening of Southern IPR protection increases the cost of imitation targeting both firms producing in the North as well as multinationals producing in the South, Northern incentives for FDI (at the firm level) are basically unaffected. How does one reconcile this result with the positive effect of increased IPR enforcement on FDI frequently emphasized in empirical work (see Lee and Mansfield, 1996) ? There are two ways out. First, increased IPR enforcement may be asymmetrical in that firms who invest in a country can expect to have a greater say in local courts relative to those that simply export. Second, imitation of firms located in the North may simply not be an option for host country firms (as may be the case for 56 While products like books, videos and CDs receive much press about conflicts over IPR protection, imitating most products is not so simple (see Pack and Westphal, 1986) . Empirical evidence indicates that imitation is indeed a costly activity for a wide range of high technology goods, such as chemicals, drugs, electronics and machinery. For example, Mansfield et al. (1981) find that the costs of imitation average 65 percent of the costs of innovation (and very few products were below 20 percent). 57 All of these models do not study the interaction between optimal policies in the two regions. In a recent paper, Lai and Qiu (1999) attempt this task and show that the South's optimal IPR protection level is lower than that of the North. More importantly, global welfare may very well suffer if the South is forced to adopt the Northern standard.
relatively poorer countries) so that any increased IPR enforcement affects only multinational firms.
As Ferrantino (1993) has noted, all of the preceding models suffer from a fundamental problem: either FDI or licensing is the only channel via which northern firms are allowed to produce in the South. 58 A more complete treatment of FDI requires that Northern firms be given the option of transacting in technology via they market. What are the consequences of strengthening IPR protection in the South if northern firms can choose between licensing and FDI? Does FDI increase with IPR enforcement or does such a policy change encourage licensing by lowering the risk of opportunism in market transactions? The latter scenario is equally likely and studies that completely ignore the possibility of licensing (or joint ventures for that matter) are likely to overstate the effect of IPR enforcement on inward FDI. In fact, a more subtle analysis may be needed. Increased IPR enforcement in the South may indeed make it a more attractive location for production (thereby increasing FDI relative to exports) but the technologies transferred for that purpose may flow through licensing rather than FDI so that the net effect on technology transfer via FDI is ambiguous. Of course, aggregate technology transfer to the South may very well increase, although general equilibrium effects may also require qualifications of this conclusion (Glass and Saggi, 1999c) .
Using data for 1982 on US exports and sales of overseas affiliates of US firms, Ferrantino (1993) presents a detailed cross-country study that attempts to identify the determinants of both exports and sales of multinational affiliates of US firms, as suggested by the gravity model. His analysis reveals many insights but perhaps the most interesting finding is that the US exports more to its affiliates in countries that are non-adherents. Ferrantino (1993) suggests that this may reflect a desire to conceal information about the production process by confining production within the borders of the US. This interpretation fits well with a central idea theme of this paper: multinational firms will adjust their strategies to optimize against policies and market conditions they face in various host countries, casting doubts about the conclusions of empirical (or theoretical) work that treats FDI as given.
Empirical evidence also indicates that the level of IPR protection in a country also affects the composition of FDI in two different ways (Lee and Mansfield, 1996, Smarzynska, 1999b 
Conclusions
This paper has covered a rather large terrain. It is worth emphasizing the main points in easily digestible form:
• The role of trade in encouraging growth hinges critically on the geographical scope (national versus international) of knowledge spillovers. Empirical studies have not yet settled the issue; the truth may simply be that for developing countries, spillovers are even more national in scope than for industrialized countries. Consequently, whether R&D and high technology production is carried out in close geographical proximity to a country may indeed matter for development.
• Little is known about the relative role of trade and FDI (with licensing, joint ventures etc. as special cases) as mechanisms of technology transfer. Given that foreign firms opt to produce in a developing country, FDI seems to be the preferred route and is therefore a prominent channel of technology transfer.
• A well-developed paradigm (OLI) seeks to explain the emergence of multinational firms, given the existence of viable alternatives such as exports, licensing, and joint ventures. This is 59 Using data from Mexican manufacturing firms, Tybout and Westbrook (1995) find that trade liberalization was associated with higher rates of productivity growth. useful approach for explaining static issues. The dynamic choice between alternative modes has not been adequately explored even in theory, let alone data.
• Local policy frequently makes pure FDI infeasible forcing foreign firms to opt for licensing or joint ventures. Empirical evidence supporting the idea that the latter modes of technology transfer lead to more learning by local firms is scant or completely missing. To be fair, few careful studies have attempted this difficult task. So the jury may be still out.
• Policies designed to lure in FDI have proliferated in recent years. If the case for such policies rests on positive spillovers from FDI to domestic firms, then the case may be rather weak. Several recent plant level studies have failed to find positive spillovers from FDI to firms competing directly with subsidiaries of multinationals. However, these studies need a careful interpretation since they treat FDI as exogenous. Second, FDI spillovers may have a vertical nature rather than the horizontal nature assumed in such studies. Furthermore, all such studies find that the subsidiaries of multinationals are more productive than domestic firms. Thus, regardless of the evidence on the spillover issue, FDI does result in a more effective use of resources in host countries.
• Several studies (both theoretical and empirical) indicate that absorptive capacity in the host country is crucial for obtaining significant benefits from FDI. Without adequate human capital or investments in R&D, spillovers from FDI may simply be infeasible. In fact, this may be the most robust finding of the literature discussed in the paper. Thus, liberalization of trade and FDI policies may need to be complemented by appropriate policy changes with respect to education, R&D, and human capital accumulation, if developing countries are to take full advantage of increased trade and FDI.
• IPR policy may alter the composition of FDI both at the industry level as well as the firm level. Industries in which IPRs are crucial, firms may refrain from FDI if IPR protection is weak in the host country or they may not invest in manufacturing and R&D activities. Lastly, IPR policy may also affect the mode of technology transfer (licensing, joint ventures, or establishment of wholly owned subsidiaries).
